
Organizations often migrate their Microsoft 365 tenant into a different tenant after a company restructuring, consolidation, or acquisition by a new business. The tenant migration includes, among other things, updating domains, DNS records, and mail routing where necessary to ensure a working email channel.
# DMARC

In our October 2026 scan of the Tranco top 100,000, half of the SPF records ended in ~all and 45.1% in -all. Does the difference matter once a domain publishes a DMARC policy? Microsoft's SPF setup guide, last updated in July 2026, says it does: DMARC counts both as SPF failures, but "the DMARC policy is effectively ignored for SPF ~all failures" when the message has no DKIM signature. It recommends -all for that reason.
# SPF & DKIM

You can't have multiple SPF records on one domain name: if a lookup returns two or more TXT records that start with v=spf1, RFC 7208 says SPF evaluation ends in permerror, so no sender can pass. The fix is to merge all your senders into a single record.
# SPF & DKIM

In early November 2026, Outlook.com and Hotmail refused mail from domains that publish no DMARC record, even when SPF and DKIM passed. MailRoute says it first saw the refusals in its outbound logs on 5 November 2026, senders compared notes on the mailop list on 6 November, and Spamresource reproduced it on 7 November. The refusal came during the SMTP session and read:
# DMARC

An SPF record is one DNS TXT record at your domain that starts with v=spf1, followed by mechanisms that say which servers may send mail for the domain, each with an optional qualifier, and optionally the modifiers redirect= and exp=, once each. Spaces separate the terms.
# SPF & DKIM

SPF permerror (permanent error) means a receiver couldn't complete its SPF check because of what's published in DNS: two v=spf1 records, a syntax error, too many DNS lookups, too many void lookups, or an include that points to a name with no SPF record. RFC 7208 says it "definitely requires DNS operator intervention", so resending won't help. The record has to change.
# SPF & DKIM

We analyzed the DNS of 99,441 domains from the Tranco top 100,000: 60.2% published a DMARC record and 21.7% published p=reject. Among the 72,645 with a non-null MX record, 91.5% published SPF, 76.0% published DMARC, and 47.9% published a reject or quarantine policy.
# DMARC
RFC 7208 spells out how a receiver should evaluate an SPF record, including broken ones, and DMARC says what to do when the result isn't a pass. SPF checkers, as we found in our comparison of free SPF checkers, mostly agree with the standard, if not always with each other. But neither the standard nor a checker decides whether your mail arrives. The receiving server does.
# SPF & DKIM
In part one, we asked 21 mailbox providers what they do with a broken SPF record. This part is about what they say. An SMTP refusal gives the sender a reply code and a line of text, and for most senders that reply, plus whatever their sending software makes of it, is the only explanation they'll ever get.
# DMARC
For an MSP, a DMARC platform needs to do more than parse aggregate reports. It should make it easy to separate client environments, control access, monitor many domains from one place, and turn DMARC management into a scalable service rather than another source of administrative overhead.
# DMARC